ShelfSnap findings confirm a significant opportunity allowing the shelf to give new feedback to both big data analytics and to store merchandising in order to improve execution.  Store shelves can be “Fracked” applying new age measurements of shelf implementation offered through Intelligent Image Interpretation (ShelfSnap), which yields significant new growth.

The excitement in the FMCG industry has been driven by Big Data type analytics applied to Shopper Insights efforts over the last 4-5 years.  Part of that effort has centered around resetting categories in more consumer sensible ways and part in bringing out dozens of line additions and extensions as a real resurgence in item additions impacts the shelf.  Some modest growth has accompanied the excitement…but much more growth lies trapped at the shelf.

The growth limitation is that these exciting new efforts are tied to the old business feedback loops.  Those feedback loops include the combination of Old School Measures from the syndicated providers, proxy measures from POS sensing data or self-reported activity reports from the Sales Force Automation systems.   The fallacy of this model is reported effectively in the Better is Better.

Execution has not kept pace with the new ideas about shelf and promotion, and it may in fact be on the decline.

This translates into many a great plan being miss-implemented or not implemented at all.

We find that the application of new age measures like ShelfSnap offer fresh, unique and above all accurate  “big data” information portraying the reality of the shelf and execution.  This yields learning that make current big data understanding about consumer behavior more productive.  It also reveals the gap between plan and shelf in a way hidden by Old School Information sources.   

We have proven that acting on this Shelf Back communication is worth high single or low double digit sales growth.  Couple that with a clear shelf strategy based on the reality of today’s opportunity and we get “Fracking” types of returns…without the risk to the growndwater!.

It seems to me that this article in Business Insider’s IGNITION covers three elements important to those involved in FMCG brands and banners.

• The rationale he puts behind the title of the article is interesting in and of itself.  It is hard for businesses limited in scope, but otherwise promising to attract capital today.  Part of that hurdle is that it is hard for suppliers of high risk capital to exit their investment.  If Google, IBM, Microsoft or eBay are not interested in buying the startup, and there is no appetite for banks to support a limited size IPO, how will the Venture Group exit?  Further upstream, the implications for startups are not good.  And let’s not forget, startups are the real engine for job growth.
• The fact there is a flurry of activity in food delivery services is also interesting.  This activity predicts further incursions of companies munching on the current FMCG value chain.  Profits have been robust for manufacturers, but very uneven for distributors and the incursions mentioned in the article are going to impact the distributor side more.  I find it curious that we are witnessing a resurgence in the grocer online and delivery space…the first real moves since the early part of the last decade.
• Innovative ideas about the business appear to be lacking, according to Mr. Patricof.  Either all of the services look alike or they are not able to communicate their unique value proposition to the VC community (which probably means they do not have one.)  Not really surprising.  Many of the efforts over the last decade to digitize the Every Household, Every week grocer chose are very fragmented, requiring the consumer to organize and integrate the various options (see: competing grocery multichannel ).  Entrepreneurs are once again tempted to solve a problem addressing a huge market….but they have not quite gotten it right….yet.

In today’s market this grocery list is driven by coupon and circular items that anchor the plan for the week.

For the consumer in store displays are:

·         a reminder of items on the list,

·          additional inventory to service the shopping list demands

·          One of the few communication platforms available to create shopper interest.

That ability to communicate requires a display to be in the right place, contain the right product quantity and have all necessary information for purchase to successfully closing the deal.

Traditional display activity measurements are purely quantitative.  They do not help understand how well displays meet these new consumer needs.

ShelfSnap is uniquely qualified to measure display quality across two important attributes.  Both affect the communication platform value of the display.  Those attributes are:

·         Price marking:  Surprisingly often displays go up but are either not signed at all or are signed but with no price in sight.  A display cannot complete its communication of value duty to a list equipped shopper if no price is evident.  This is the most critical  qualitative measure.   The display below is beautiful….but is not priced and therefore cannot sell.

·         Size of display: Size DOES count.  Not just the absolute number of units on display but how they are arrayed in the contect of the display environment. Does the product interrupt the buys shopper’s visual attention?    The one below is priced, but is such a small quantity in such a potpourri of products that it has no impact on the shopper hurrying along

The display above, while small, is priced and in a location where it is bound to catch the eye of even the most dedicated list shopper.

Measuring the Quality of Display yields very different results than the old school Quantity measurements.  To illustrate we evaluated a seasonal display program for stuffing mix across the three largest grocery selling retailers.

 Traditional analytics rank the chains by the uantity of stores with the display.  That is depicted in the first column.   

Columns two and three reflect the better the effectiveness of the display to deliver the value proposition to the shopper.   Note that while Chain 3 remains the best performer, the other two chains are now in a virtual tie with each other and closed the gap with Chain 3. 

The final column is a qualitative measure of display efficiency.  In a sense it answers questions about how much of the quantity attained was worthwhile. In this case Chain 2 which generated the least impressive quantity, delivered the most value on that quantity.

The current recession and its impact on Shoppers gives trading partners an opportunity for new thinking about the role, tactics and measurement of displays.  Measure the quality of a display not just the quantity in order to manage a more valuable communication  platform and  gain competitive advantage in both marketing and efficient resource deployment.

Part 4 in this series looking at fictional business models involving Digital Powerhouses encroaching on traditional, physical grocery business.  These models are submitted for your consideration.  They are taken from full,  free case studies which are available  by emailing mike.spindler@shelfsnap.com.  If you would like help in using these case studies in your  corporate  strategy  sessions please  contact bill.bishop@brickmeetsclick.com   

Still finding it’s way in the  revenue  generation  world, Facebook develops  an approach to  the  Every  Household,  Every  Week world  that  sneaks up  on traditional  grocery,  multiplies  Facebook  revenues and  reinforces the  importance  of the Facebook community. 

The play here capitalizes  on the very real move  toward  Health  Through  Better  Lifestyle.  This  amalgamation  of  individual efforts by many different shoppers is  custom  made for any  online  community   with that shopper, represented  through their Facebook page, as its center.  The market is quite  fragmented with “solutions” ranging from nutritional supplements, low meat, no dairy, high plant, locovore, vegan, anti-toxin, lo sodium to any combination of these with or without exercise, yoga, health-care professionals and more.  It includes the very real and difficult to serve dietary needs of allergen and disease sufferers such as diabetics and celiacs.

What is it:

A service aggregator, built around the private needs of each consumer or family, is a viable approach to this business, and very much lends itself to the Facebook model and strengths.  Facebook leverages it’s consumer centric power by focusing the commerce/content and community on meeting the unique “stated needs” of each individual who is looking to gain some control over their eating and other habits in an effort to become a bit healthier.  Facebook calls this the Facebook Health Network.

1. Facebook participants are given the opportunity to develop a private, Health Page.  It includes goals, conditions and metrics.  The user details currently used solutions (products and providers) for both consumables and for services.  The application allows for multiple types of input including scanned bar-codes or photographs of products.  It includes services such as yoga or weekly blood pressure check results at the local Firehouse.  It encourages editing to reflect changing needs and tastes.  
2. Facebook then aggregates users along many different needs criteria from the very specific (“Uses pharma statins, looking for natural alternatives in Rosewood neighborhood of Austin, TX) to very general (wants to learn more about the relationship between animal consumption and disease.) 
3. Facebook builds a network of Health Marketplace providers of both services and products to solve for its user base.  Some of these are national (GNC, Walgreens or CVS, Whole Foods, The Fresh Market) others are regional or local (local produce coop, the hatha yoga place in town).  Both home delivery and store pickup products are included but in the case of store pickup only very local stores are included in the options. (more in the case study).
4. Facebook also aggregates service and product offerings for the user. (more in case study).
5. Facebook also arranges content for the user based on their stated needs.  Included are articles that should be of interest, books, seminars and the like. Once it had aggregated enough common interests, Facebook would also organize sponsored webinars or seminars by authors and experts for the user base.  
6. As important as this very personalized Facebook Health page is for the user, it is private.  Facebook protects the user from peripheral or meaningless content and absolutely respects any “remove me” instructions from the user. 

What it would look like to the Consumer:

·         All Facebook customers receive an invitation to participate in the Facebook Health Network thru the construction of their private Health Page.  Benefits are fully described.  One of several “health goodie packs” (more in case study).

·         A second chance opt in will be shipped to customers who did not take advantage of the initial offer.  As popularity builds “people in your network” solicitations will be added to the communication.

·         As customers sign up content heavy updates begin to be published into their Health Network Private Pages.  Three tier offers begin to appear for products and services: (more in case study)  

·         Customers avail themselves of other generalized services (recipes) or sign up for fee-based customized services (recipes based on what I like, don’t like.)

·         Customers also join specialized groups (dealing with celiacs in public schools, heart healthy running tracks in Manhattan, reviews of vegan meals in non-vegan restaurants in Chicago) and input into any of the content, groups, offerings or ratings directly.

·         All current Facebook customers are be located on a grid overlayed with product and service suppliers (local), once they have opted in on their Health Networks Page.

·         All local, regional or national suppliers of products will be invited to participate in special offerings to meet the aggregated needs of the users.  (more in case study)

·         New product offerings (perhaps with samples) are made available for applicable Health Network Page Participants. This and other “inclusive” offerings feed the virtuous circle of membership benefits.

·         Continuous communications, fed by customer reactions to prior offers and rejections, look toward enlarging the basket of products purchased through the Network.   If you buy your supplements from us, why not your aspirin?  As a customer I decide how many or few of these types of offers I receive. (more in case study)

·         Facebook also supplies a price comparison mobile application so I can compare in-store prices with network prices for items not yet on my list.  Network product providers are expected to match or beat the price checked. 

What it would look like for the Players: For Facebook:

Facebook generates revenues by participating in the Every Household, Every Week business.  A large and growing group of the EHEW marketplace shows more interest each week in the subjects offered by Health Through Better Lifestyle.  This fragmented Lifestyle market does not lend itself readily to general merchants such as grocers.  Even grocers such as Sprouts and Whole Foods cannot meet all needs (product, price or convenience for instance) especially for services.   A service aggregator, built around the private needs of each consumer or family, is a viable approach to this business, and very much lends itself to the Facebook model and strengths.

The revenues stem from:

• Product and service advertising revenues
• Product sales referral commissions
• Product and service promotion dollars
• Customer participation fees for special services or events

The buildup and refinement of Big Data capabilities to serve aggregated markets, the infrastructure to enlist Network Partners, the outbound communications refinements and the tracking capabilities will all serve markets in addition the Health Through Better Lifestyle market.  The Health Through Better Lifestyle s market is already huge and is becoming a much bigger rapidly.  In the U.S. alone the FMCG product market is one Trillion dollars.  Modest success in this market will more than double Facebook revenues is a short time.

For the Network Product and Service Providers:

The Health Through Better Lifestyle market is fragmented. It is difficult for providers and manufacturers to reach consumers via almost any media and it is difficult to make products avialable to consumers.  (more in the case study)

For Competitors:

The Health Through Better Lifestyle market gets a good deal of attention in traditional supermarket, drug and mass environments.  Walmart has announced major commitments to a product assortment that will encourage more healthy lifestyles and Walgreens offers similar encouragement and adds a variety of advisement services.  However, (more in case study)

For Manufacturers:

Very similar list as for providers.  If manufacturer has e-commerce abilities this is one way to move customers from Network-Provider, to Network-Direct.  (More in case study) Could others do this?

Potentially Google, Yahoo and eBay.  Certainly Walmart, Walgreens or CVS could attempt.  Getting a network of other retailers and service providers would be a hurdle for the retail entities.  

This is the second fictional model describing efforts of major digital companies to move into traditional, physical grocer turf.  It is meant as a discussion piece.  For the complete , free case study send a request to mike.spindler@shelfsnap.com.  If you wish to engage  in a meaningful dialogue about the implications for traditional grocery or possible defensive actions contact Bill Bishop at bill.bishop@brickmeetslick.com . 

Much has been said about Amazon’s rapid warehouse expansion, their 1 day delivery efforts, their toying with delivery lockers in bricks and mortar stores, and their fresh grocery escapades in Seattle.   The real model might well emerge to look like this: 

What is it?: 

Amazon leverages its warehouses, its buying power, its systems and interface expertise, its big data handling and mostly its command over the consumer in the following manner:  

1.  It collaborates with Walgreens, WaWa, Sheetz, and a number of other high quality C-store operators to provide consumers 20,000 convenient, around the corner, consumer friendly pickup Depot Partners.  
2. Amazon ships the bulk of the shopper grocery order from its closest warehouse to the Depot Partner’s warehouse where the Depot Partner trucks move it to the appropriate stores.
3.  Amazon offers it’s entire long-tail product inventory from online books to TV sets to be delivered to the home or with the rest of the groceries to the Depot.  
4. Fill in grocery items (meat, fresh, bakery, meal solutions) are provided much like The Fresh Market today through local or regional suppliers.   Many of those are items available through the Depot Partner (milk from Walgreens, sandwiches and other meal solutions via WaWa.)
5. Each site is “faced” with an Amazon order site touting all products, sourced from whatever is appropriate for that local site.  For instance: the Walgreens store at Rand and Miller Road in Lake Zurich supplies the milk, bread and some agreed upon set of other items to the Amazon customer.  Most of the customer’s order has been assembled by Amazon in totes and shipped to the Walgreens distribution center where the Walgreens portion is added and then the order is topped off  with those last few store based items at the store.  For overlap items (available via both Amazon and the local retail Depot Partner) a decision on supplier will be made, a price point agreed upon and a reference fee paid to the partner who does not supply.
6.  The roll-out of the service can be a localized or regional offering, allowing Amazon and it’s Depot Partners to use profitable areas to fund new markets.
7.   As network volume grows, the players would have the opportunity to consolidate purchasing power for products, promotions and advertising dollars from manufacturers and service providers.  

What it would look like to the Customer:

•  All current Amazon customers would be assigned to a Depot Partner location depending on their address.  If there are two or more Depot possibilities, the customer would be contacted to choose the one easiest for that customer to access.    
• The initial Amazon communications will provide base level benefits which include:

o   (more in the case study)

•   Subsequent communications will explain the additional benefits of the Depot deliver, specifically
  •  Full online grocery shopping, all products including fresh 
  • Thousands upon thousands of choices (more in case study)

•  More and more focused communications from Amazon as it uses the growing treasure-trove of individual consumer likes and dislikes to make product targeting and pricing more efficient for you.
• XXXX(retailer)-Amazon Depot signage at the retail location.  In store signage support.  
• If you are a loyalty member or have given your email address to the retailer you will be introduced to the concept by that retailer (Walgreens, Wawa, or) with follow-on communications coming from Amazon.. 
• Amazon Flow comparison shopping expanded to FMCG items.  Price compare at Walmart or Kroger or Hy-Vee and simply order for delivery to your home or for pickup at the local Depot.     

What it would look like for the Players :

Amazon gains from its direct sale of frozen and shelf stable foods, pet foods, cleaning products, HBA items and of course from its immense offerings in books, music, kitchen goods, clothing and consumer electronics.  It’s contact frequency increases to Every Week and it’s reach increases to potentially Every Household within the logical reach of a Depot.  

Walgreens is just starting it’s loyalty program.  Many of the better C’ Store operators also run loyalty programs.  Those loyalty programs will be joined together into Amazon’s PRIME loyalty program.  (more in case study)

Amazon will gain efficiency by reducing the number of delivery points while increasing reach.  The average items per order picked will also increase significantly making investments in picking and packing technology pay our sooner and more robustly.  

Amazon will gain substantial knowledge about current and additional customers. Amazon Depot Partners will supply Amazon information about local competitors so that additional pressure can be generated on attracting customers in markets where the competitor appears to be weakening.  

For Amazon Depot Partners:

The Depot Partner initial investments are small, but scale with business growth.   Parking space, pickup call technology and labor are the biggest expansion challenges.  However, partners are richly rewarded with additional traffic and all of, or a share of the profits from fresh produce, meats, meal solutions, and products that are best served from local transportation (soda, beer, cigarettes, water) as well as fuel (WaWa or Sheetz) and or pharmacy (Walgreens) sales of course.  

(more in case study)

For Manufacturers:

•  Pros:
  • Much more focused access to a growing body of consumers who will either put your product on their regular list or want access to non FMCG products through the Prime network.
  • Potential opportunities to help Amazon up-sell, cross cell and participate in first-sell penetration strategies.
  • More information about consumers and their deliberations on your brands and competitors.
  • Opportunity to concentrate product trial, promotions and advertising dollars.
• Cons: 
  • Most favored nation status on pricing, advertising and promotion dollars will be expected.  The volume from the network will rival and perhaps surpass the largest customer you have at the moment. 
  • Efforts to influence customers will be more direct, but less in your control.
  •  Traditional retailers will be very aggressive in pricing and advertising demands to combat the Amazon Depot Network. 

For Competitors:

This concept bleeds traditional grocers one customer/trip/item at a time.   (more in case study)

Could anyone else do this:

Combinations of collaborators such as ShopRunner and eBay might be able to pull this off.  The most productive combinations would be current bricks and mortar retailer combinations like Walmart and Walgreens, but the overlap in current physical business-geographies is quite a hurdle to overcome.  Amazon has quite a lead in capitalizing on this model, but will need to become much more collaborative to pull it off.

These blogs are fictional representations of business models that might be used to penetrate the traditional, physical store, supermarket business.  The purpose is to give the reader food for thought and a forum for discussion. One version of how dominant digital consumer players become entrenched in grocery is a collaborative process with a specific selection of traditional brick and mortar grocers.  

In this case Google simply buys its way into the EHEW (every household, every week grocery) market via MyWebGrocer (B2B2C supermarket specialists).  This blogpiece is shortened for publication.  For the complete, free, case email mike.spindler@shelfsnap.com.  For additional hands-on discussion facilitation you can schedule time with  Bill Bishop’s BrickMeetsClick  BlackBelt team in person or online at bill.bishop@brickmeetsclick.com.   

What is it? Google leverages its advertising and search expertise to capitalize and expand on the technology connection that MyWebGrocer has with consumers shopping in over 10,000 domestic supermarkets, and a growing body of stores overseas.   

1. The combination creates a Google Marketplace offering, with each consumer’s version of that marketplace anchored by a very local Supermarket.       Google leverages its knowledge of consumer touch points, isolating and identifying consumers living around the stores with which MyWebGrocer has relationships.  These consumers represent just over 1/3^rd of the Every Household, Every Week market in the U.S. 
2. Google builds out a Marketplace network of national retail players (Bestbuy, JCP, Sears, Macy) to fill the role Amazon fills by itself.  With these Google creates a long tail of competitive product pricing and promotion with delivery either to the consumer household or to the partnering supermarket. 
3.  Google builds out a Marketplace network of services and retailers localized around the supermarkets to supplement partner supermarket offerings with either products not handled, or services.  It finally conquers the local search and advertising business.
4.  Google brings its wallet more effectively to the partner network.
5. Google brings its Big Data and algorithmic capabilities to bear on the creating a virtuous cycle of growth from this consumer base including: (more in the case study)
6. Google brings the manufacturer community to the table with a package of  personalized services and advertising opportunities much more valuable than anything thought about or available today.  (More in case study.)
7. Google focuses first on growing the penetration of needs for current customers, and then with gathering their neighbors, targeting over 70% of the total population through current network Supermarkets. 

What it would look like to the consumer:

• The 70% of the population who live within a reasonable distance of any of the 10,000 MyWebGrocer customer supermarkets will immediately see a strong uptick in focused communications, from that retail store.  The offers come to you even if the store does not know your email address, Facebook page or smartphone.  The chances are good that Google would know it.  If none of the parties had access to an active communication pipe to you, there would be a focused effort to secure that communication pipe, regardless of cost.  Once the email address is  obtained the shopper sees: (Much more here, for the complete free, case email mike.spindler@shelfsnap.com) 
• As you move up the loyalty pipeline: (More here too, if you wish a facilitated review and guide to help formulate a response email bill.bishop@brickmeetsclick.com ) 

What it would look like for the players:  For the Target Supermarkets:  

•  Pros: (more in the case study)  
• Cons: 

For the Marketplace Participants:   

For Manufacturers: 

•  Pros
• Cons 

For Google:

Pros:

• Google gets to be a serious long term player in a market combining retailer-advertiser and consumer, which will otherwise be dominated by Amazon, Walmart, Tesco, eBay, Facebook, Rakuten, NewsAmerica, BH Media, Yahoo or a small number of other companies. 
•  Google through its MyWebGrocer purchase gains access to powerful retail collaborators and manufacturers for over a third of the U.S. supermarket locations with access to a much larger percentage of the customer markets, along with a growing overseas presence.  
•  Google leverages the fact that most grocery shopping is still done in store today, and most of the groceries are still bought in supermarkets.   
•  Moreover as consumers move toward online grocery shopping and store pickup continues to grow in popularity Google, via this purchase has the best built in migration path.  
•  Google obtains a large, ready gateway and glide-path into the Every Household,  Every Week market.  
  • (More in case study)
•  They develop a networked answer to Amazon.  That network consists of:
• • The close, loyal, frequent and ever-growing  relationships Google develops with a large base of EH,EW consumers through the collaborative supermarket client list, 
  •  A growing network of non-grocery retailers with e-commerce capabilities (clothing, books, electronics, HBC, housewares, office supplies) who can supply products either via UPS or for store pickup at the consumer’s regular networked grocery store (providing reference sales revenues to Google.)
  •  A network of local service and retail outlets to fill in the customer network needs (cleaning, banking etc.) offering both reference sales and advertising revenues.
• Finally they develop an advertiser package of services and offerings that are much more valuable to the advertiser, the retailer and the consumer than anything that can be thought of today.  

Cons:

• This vision requires money
•  This vision requires collaboration with many different retail players
•  This vision requires a big data play on all sides of the demand and supply chain
•  This vision requires playing favorites and some change to base business models 

What does this look like for competitive merchants: (more here as well, in the case) 

Why MyWebGrocer?

MyWebGrocer has the largest e-commerce/e-marketing footprint with traditional bricks and mortar grocers in the world, by far.  It recognized early on that the Every Household, Every Week grocery market is different than other online consumer experiences.  It:

• Uniquely built its applications based on the EHEW (grocery) model, 
•  adapts constantly to both new capabilities and to the deepening consumer experience base and
• works diligently to stay miles ahead of other approaches 

Why Google?

Pretty much any of the etailers or emarketers could play Google’s role in this model including Amazon, eBay, Facebook, Rakuten, NewsAmerica, BH Media, perhaps Catalina and now Yahoo. 

What: There has been much speculation on how soon big etailers or emarketers will dominate the CPG space (see http://brandedpantry.com/2011/09/02/making-a-list-checking-it-twice/).  These companies will make it happen, as the Every Household, Every Week (EHEW) consumer is just too enticing to ignore.   

How: In the next four blogs we will position a few models using real company examples.

•          One with a combination of Google and a select group of traditional retail including grocery at its core.
•          One with Amazon in collaboration with an interesting set of very hungry retailers.
•          One with Facebook holding center stage and creeping up on the market in a way you might least expect.
•          And finally….well one that has not yet been written but if I have my way will be based on a factual reporting rather than educated speculation.

The Challenge: How would you react to these threats to your customers?

Competitors do not have to take all of your customers to drive you into decline and probable demise.  They just have to bleed off enough customers, shopping trips or remove an item from enough baskets, to move your store from making a little money to losing a little money.   Once that is done, you will adjust costs somewhere in your organization which puts an additional chink in your armor.  If the competitor can identify that chink…they can attack and bleed off just a bit more business…and the spiral continues.  

 Traditionally, this attack is obvious.  Mariano’s opened a store in the Libertyville, IL area where our offices are located.  It is half a mile south of a large Jewel store.   Now every day, if Jewel watches Mariano’s parking lot, they can see their former customers frequenting the new store.  They can look at the Mariano’s flyer and see what the special prices are, they can visit the Mariano’s store and see what assortment and in-store promotions are in place and if they have the wherewithal and the desire Jewel can fight back and try to recapture some of the business using those same tools.

The onslaught from this list of digital competitors, will still bleed off customers, trips or most probably basket items, but the activity and the result won’t be obvious at all.    The tools, the pricing, the promotion, the assortment will all be behind the scenes in emails, web visits, personalized offers and mobile connections.  These competitors will see your moves and your efforts with great clarity.  You won’t see theirs at all.   

Gather your team and use these case studies to map out how you will react….and then evaluate how well each action might work.  Additional details are available from mike.spindler@shelfsnap.com  For additional hands on facilitation you schedule time with  Bill Bishop’s BrickMeetsClick  BlackBelt team in person or online at bill.bishop@brickmeetsclick.com.   

• ·         tell stories about the products                          
• ·         play trailers of movies,
• ·         playing cuts from a CD,
•                        
•             compare prices with other stores
• ·         display nutritional values, allergen warnings or more suitable alternatives or
• ·         rank product features based on a shopper chosen criteria. 

Both applications are in for a hard row to hoe in CPG because of the Gap between the product images and data available from brands or commercial data capture houses, and the actual packaging on the retail shelf.   

ShelfSnap has done the only empirical studies of this gap (The Consumer Relevant Product Image and Data Gap) and found the gap between data and shelf to affect 64% the products commonly stocked on key retailer shelves.   To amplify the work it has already done on entire categories, ShelfSnap recently evaluated the gap for shopping baskets of almost two hundred items ordered online from one of the top two online grocers in the world.  

 We compared what we saw online and the nutritional panel information for the products we ordered each week, to the products we received:

·         63% of the products delivered had packaging that differed from the image online.

·         58% of the items with differing packaging also had differences in the primary nutritional panel on the package vs. what was represented online.

·         The images used by the retailer were supplied by the manufacturer or by one of two top commercial houses claiming absolutely accurate data.  It may have been accurate for the products it portrayed, but it wasn’t Relevant to the products delivered or available on shelf to the consumer.

Without tying products the products that consumers are finding on shelf or in their delivery totes back to the product images and especially the health and wellness data in the mobile or online application brands and retailers will at least sub-optimize the potential of these great new tools, and more seriously may raise the consumer’s ire by appearing to mislead them.  Can anyone say Pink Slime?

My family has changed quite a bit in the last two years.

The household went from one generation to three and from 2 members to five plus a dog.  That means that our purchase and shopping practices have changed and the amounts have grown.  We moved from a focus almost entirely based on convenience (a great deal of Peapod, Costco, The Fresh Market and Osco) to one where variety, cost and convenience need to meet a happy middle ground.  We now routinely shop at Peapod, Jewel-Osco,  Dominicks, Target, Walmart (which now is a SuperCenter), Walgreens and a ton more Amazon.   Unit purchases are up more than 100% each and every week.

About mid-February the most active carnivore in the HH went virtually vegan overnight and has pretty much stayed that way ever since.

Two big lifestyle changes that should have fired off some set of customer attraction activities from this set of retailers…..and nothing.

 Walmart has done a decent job of creating an impression in-store.   Chicago is one of the towns where they have heavy advertising about their price matching efforts (specifically aimed at Jewel.)  They have amplified that by adding some in-store personnel who try to recognize and call out shoppers they have seen a number of times (and ones with big baskets.)  One of the family members was chased down and guided through the price matching efforts at the register.  I am not sure how well it would have worked without this shopper ambassador, but it made an impression.  However, what personal service giveth, produce taketh away….no Cucumbers….on a Tuesday…in the summer.  Huh?

Target and Jewel have done nothing to gain trips or basket.  Jewel used to be our preferred vendor prior to switching to Peapod 4 years ago.  Now the OSCO drive through gets almost all of our action with them.

Peapod should have been in the best position to pick up on these changes and figure out a way to maintain their share at least, and perhaps improve their position.  However to chase their declining share (if they even realize it) they threaten to demote our VIP status if we don’t order four times in the next two weeks.  HUH? 

We hear about the exploding use of Big Data by retailers to target “their customer”.    Shopping 5-6 stores for our very large weekly needs is hard work.   If one of these players would put the data to work they could focus against our balance of needs for convenience, value and assortment and make our job easier, and their share of our business much, much bigger.   However either their big data capabilities are too limited, or they don’t know the right questions to ask.  In this case none of the players has done a very good job of making our family choose their store, as “our store.”